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Abstract
Voice conversion, a technique to change one’s voice to sound
like that of another, poses a threat to even high performance
speaker verification system. Vulnerability of text-independent
speaker verification systems under spoofing attack, using statis-
tical voice conversion technique, was evaluated and confirmed
in our previous work. In this paper, we further extend the study
to text-dependent speaker verification systems. In particular, we
compare both joint density Gaussian mixture model (JD-GMM)
and unit-selection (US) spoofing methods and, for the first
time, the performances of text-independent and text-dependent
speaker verification systems in a single study. We conduct the
experiments using RSR2015 database which is recorded using
multiple mobile devices. The experimental results indicate that
text-dependent speaker verification system tolerates spoofing
attacks better than the text-independent counterpart.
Index Terms: Speaker verification, text-dependent, text-
independent, voice conversion, spoofing attack, security
1. Introduction
Voice biometrics become popular especially in smartphone or
telephony applications where voice services are provided. To
automatically and accurately verify the claimed identity of a
speaker based on just the speech sample is the main task of
a speaker verification system [1]. Speaker verification encom-
passes two different input modes: text-independent speaker ver-
ification (TI-SV) and text-dependent speaker verification (TD-
SV). TD-SV requires the speaker to speak a specific textual
transcription, while TI-SV does not have this constraint and
allows the speaker to speak freely during enrolment and ver-
ification. TD-SV assumes cooperative speakers, while TI-SV
doesn’t. Both TD-SV and TI-SV are ideal for many access con-
trol applications, such as telephone banking or online transac-
tion [2], whereby the objective is to protect personal secret and
privacy. Thus, the reliability of such verification system is the
major concern to the clients.
To address such concern, the vulnerability of speaker ver-
ification systems under spoofing attacks has been evaluated in
many studies. Several methods have been employed to simulate
the spoofing attack, including replay attacks [3, 4], human voice
mimicking [5] and artificial signal spoofing [6]. Such methods
do not really generate voice utterances of specific content re-
quired by a text-dependent speaker verification system.
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Speech synthesis and voice conversion techniques have
become easily accessible for attackers, which pose a serious
threat to the reliability of contemporary speaker verification sys-
tem. In [7], the authors used an adapted HMM-based speech
synthesis system, which is flexible to generate one speaker’s
voice given the transcripts, to simulate spoofing attacks. In
[8], voice conversion technique was employed to simulate the
spoofing attack, and text-independent speaker verification sys-
tems with and without high level text-constraint information
are compared. In addition to the studies using high quality
speech, spoofing attack studies are also carried out using tele-
phone quality speech. In [9, 10], voice conversion technique
was adopted to convert telephone quality speech to attack sev-
eral different speaker verification systems including the classic
GMM-UBM system and the state-of-the-art joint factor analysis
system.
In general, the above spoofing attack studies focus only
on text-independent speaker verification systems, which do not
directly utilize phonetic or linguistic information. Neverthe-
less, it has been shown that a text-independent speaker verifi-
cation systems can be compromised to an unacceptable level
[9, 10]. To respond to the security concern of text-dependent
speaker verification systems, in some early studies, as reported
in [11, 12, 13], the authors conducted the spoofing attack against
an HMM-based text-prompted speaker verification system. In
this paper, we make a comparative study to examine the perfor-
mance of text-dependent and text-independent speaker verifica-
tion systems under the same spoofing attacks, using two differ-
ent voice conversion methods: joint density Gaussian mixture
model method and unit-selection based method. To safeguard
personal devices such as smartphones and other mobile devices,
the industry has started using voice biometrics for access con-
trol of them [14]. In this paper, we would like to look into the
performance of speaker verification systems under spoofing at-
tacks on smartphones or mobile devices.
2. Database
In this work, we use the nine sessions of the first two parts of
the RSR2015 database [15]. This corpus has been recorded
using multiple mobile devices and smartphones as a standard
benchmarking database for text-dependent speaker verification
system development and evaluation. During the recording, a
speaker reads 30 pass-phrases for each session of part 1 and 30
short commands for each session of part 2. The average du-
ration of the pass-phrases is 3.2 seconds. Two non-overlapping
sets of speakers are defined: a background set including 50 male
and 47 female speakers, and an evaluation set of 50 male and 47
female speakers. Speakers from the background set are reserved
for training of universal background model.
During the experiments, each speaker from the evaluation
set is used both as a target speaker and as an impostor against
others from the same gender. Out of the 9 sessions available
for each speaker, three sessions are used for enrolment (ses-
sions 1, 4 and 7) while the six remaining sessions are used as
test material. Note that enrolment and test sessions are defined
so that the recording device used for test is different from the
one used during the enrolment. Moreover, in order to avoid
overlapping between enrolment and test sentences for the case
of text-independent speaker verification, we split the 30 sen-
tences into two groups. Pass-phrases 1 to 20 will be used as
testing utterances while sentences 21 to 30 are kept for enrol-
ment purpose. Thus, 120 utterances from each speaker are used
to produce genuine and impostor trials (20 pass-phrases and 6
sessions). The statistics of the trials are presented in Table 1.
Given this protocol, we note that only the genuine and impostor
trials with matched pass-phrase and gender are considered.
Table 1: Statistics of the baseline and spoofing database
Male Female Total
Target speakers 50 47 97
Genuine trials 5,942 5,615 11,557
Impostor trials 290,622 258,180 548,802
Converted trials 290,622 258,180 548,802
To design the spoofing attack corpus, we convert the test-
ing segments for the impostor trials while the genuine trials are
kept untouched. This allows us to focus solely on the effects
of spoofing attack. We design the spoofing attack corpus by
repeating the following three steps for each impostor trial:
 Establish a transformation function between the impos-
tor and the target speaker’s speech;
 Apply the transformation function to convert the testing
segment of the impostor;
 Use the converted speech as testing sample for the im-
postor.
Thus, the number of converted trials is the same as the num-
ber of impostor trials, as shown in Table 1. Generation of the
spoofing attack data, described further in Section 4, requires ad-
ditional data to establish a relationship between the attacker and
target speech. For this purpose, we use short commands from
the part 2 of the RSR2015 database in which text material does
not overlap with the 30 pass-phrases of the test data. All the 30
short commands from a single session are used as training data
for voice conversion.
3. Speaker verification systems
Text-independent system has shown to be vulnerable to spoof-
ing attack, where false alarm rate increases considerably under
spoofing attacks [10, 9]. In this study, we investigate the per-
formance of text-dependent speaker verification system under
spoofing attack using text-independent speaker verification sys-
tem for comparison.
The classic Gaussian mixture model with universal back-
ground model (GMM-UBM) [16, 17] is employed to build both
text-dependent and text-independent speaker verification sys-
tems. Although more advanced techniques, for instance, joint
factor analysis (JFA) [18] or i-vector PLDA [19, 20] could have
been used for the spoofing attack study, as reported in our previ-
ous work [10, 9]. We consider here the well known GMM-UBM
for the following reasons. Firstly, the RSR2015 text-dependent
speaker recognition database consists of utterances with rela-
tively short duration (3-second nominal duration). For short-
duration training and test utterances, the conventional GMM-
UBM with maximum a posteriori adaptation [21] has shown
to achieve similar performance compared with JFA or PLDA.
Secondly, no additional database is required for training GMM-
UBM system, while JFA or PLDA systems need considerable
amount of additional database to estimate the total variability,
which will result in slow computation speed.
Two gender-dependent universal background models
(UBM) are trained using the 50 male and 47 female speakers
from the background set. Each UBM model with 64 Gaussian
components is estimated using the classical expectation maxi-
mization (EM) algorithm in maximum likelihood sense.
Both text-dependent and text-independent target speaker
models are obtained by adapting the UBM mean vectors
with the maximum a posteriori (MAP) technique [21]. Text-
dependent models differ from the text-independent ones due to
the adaptation that use only constrained speech material as de-
tailed below.
3.1. Training the text-independent speaker models
Text-independent speaker models are adapted by using three
excerpts (from sessions 1, 4 and 7) of ten pass-phrases (pass-
phrase 21 to 30). Thus, 30 utterances are used to adapt each
target speaker model from the UBM. Note that the pass-phrases
from the training material do not overlap the test utterances.
3.2. Training the text-dependent speaker models
For the case of the text-dependent speaker verification system,
each pass-phrase requires its own target model. Thus three ex-
cerpts of a specific pass-phrase (from sessions 1, 4 and 7) are
used for enrolment of the speaker- and pass-phrase-dependent
GMMmodel. In this study, target speaker models are estimated
for pass-phrases 1 to 20. Note that for the case of text-dependent
speaker verification, each pass-phrase from a specific speaker
has its own model, creating 20 target models per speaker while
only one model is used in the case of text-independent speaker
verification. The statistics of the models for each speaker and
for all the speakers are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Number of target models in the text-dependent and
text-independent verification systems
Text-Dependent Text-Independent
Each speaker 20 1
All speakers 20  97 = 1,940 1  97 = 97
For both text-dependent and text-independent system, we
adopt the same acoustic front-end. 12 dimensional MFCC from
27 mel-frequency filter-bands with delta and delta-delta fea-
tures are extracted from original speech signal. Energy based
voice activity detection is employed as post-processing to re-
move non-speech frames. After that, utterance level mean vari-
ance normalization (MVN) is used to make the features with
zero mean and unit variance.
4. Voice conversion techniques
The task of voice conversion is to modify one speaker’s (source)
voice to sound like it was uttered by another speaker (target)
while keeping the language content. Thus, it becomes a tool
to attack both text-dependent and text-independent speaker ver-
ification systems. Voice conversion involves off-line training
and run-time conversion processes. During off-line training, a
transformation function between the source and target speech is
established. In the run-time conversion process, the transforma-
tion function is applied to the input testing speech to generate
the converted speech signal. In this study, we employ two voice
conversion systems to simulate the spoofing attack.
4.1. GMM-based voice conversion
The first voice conversion method is based on the joint density
Gaussian mixture model (JD-GMM), which is originally pro-
posed in [22] and now is the mainstream approach [23, 24].
In the off-line training phase, given a parallel training data
from source X speaker and target Y speaker, the source spec-
tral vectorsX = [x>1 ;x>2 ; : : : ;x>n ; : : : ;x>N ]
> and target spec-
tral vectors Y = [y>1 ;y>2 ; : : : ;y>m; : : : ;y>M ]
> are aligned us-
ing dynamic time warping algorithm, where xn 2 Rd and
ym 2 Rd. The paired feature vectors are presented as Z =
[z>1 ; z
>
2 ; : : : ; z
>
t ; : : : ; z
>
T ]
>, where z>t = [x>n ;y>m]> 2 R2d.
Gaussian mixture model (GMM) is adopted to model the
joint probability density ofX and Y as:
P (X;Y) = P (Z) =
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are the mean vector and the covariance matrix of the multivari-
ate Gaussian density N (zj(z)l ;(z)l ), respectively. For each
Gaussian component l,w(z)l is its prior probability with the con-
straint
PL
l=1 w
(z)
l = 1.
The parameters of the joint density Gaussian mixture model
(z) = fw(z)l ; (z)l ;(z)l jl = 1; 2; : : : ; Lg are estimated using
the classical expectation maximization (EM) algorithm in max-
imum likelihood (ML) sense.
During the conversion phase, for each source speech fea-
ture vector x, the joint density model is adopted to formulate
a transformation function to predict the target speaker’s feature
vector y^ = F (x), as:
F (x) =
LX
l=1
pl(x)(
(y)
l +
(yx)
l (
(xx)
l )
 1(x  (x)l ));
where pl(x) =
wlN (xjxl ;xxl )PL
k=1
wkN (xjxk;xxk )
is the posterior probabil-
ity of the source vector x belonging to the lth Gaussian.
The above transformation function is applied to the source
speech feature vector sequence, after that, the converted feature
vector sequence is forwarded to a speech synthesis vocoder to
reconstruct audible speech signals.
4.2. Unit-selection based voice conversion
In GMM-based voice conversion, the converted speech is ob-
tained by adopting transformation function y^ = F (x) to mod-
ify the source speech. Instead of modifying the source speech,
unit-selection based voice conversion directly makes use of
the original target speech in training set to generate converted
speech. The procedure of unit-selection based voice conversion
is described as follows.
During the training phase, given parallel training data X
and Y from source and target speakers, respectively, dynamic
time warping algorithm is employed to align source X and tar-
get Y speech, in order to find the spectral vector pairs Z =
[z>1 ; z
>
2 ; : : : ; z
>
t ; : : : ; z
>
T ]
>, where z>t = [x>n ;y>m]> as that
done in the training phase of GMM-based voice conversion.
This alignment process is to guarantee the phonetic or linguistic
information is not changed during the conversion phase.
In the run-time conversion phase, given a source speech fea-
ture vector x^t, it is paired up with the nearest source feature vec-
tor xn in Euclidean distance sense. The corresponding paired
target feature vector ym of xn is used as the converted speech
vector of x^t. After that, the converted feature vector sequence
is passed to the speech synthesis filter to reconstructed a speech
signal. We note that ym is the real speech frame from the orig-
inal target speech, which is different from the y^ = F (x) in
JD-GMM conversion method.
4.3. Parameterizations for voice conversion
The speech signal, which is sampled at 16 kHz, is windowed in
a 25 ms window with a 5 ms window shift. Mel-cepstral analy-
sis [25] is employed to extract 30 dimensional mel-cepstrum co-
efficients (MCC) to represent the spectral envelop. During syn-
thesis, the MCC parameters are passed to a Mel Log Spectrum
Approximation (MLSA) filter [25]. In practice, the Speech Sig-
nal Processing Toolkit (SPTK) [26] is adopted to perform mel-
cepstral analysis and as MLSA filter to reconstruct speech sig-
nal. Fundamental frequency values are extracted by the RAPT
algorithm [27]. MCC is converted by using above conversion
methods and F0 is converted by equalizing the means and vari-
ances of source and target speakers in log-scale.
5. Experimental results and discussion
To evaluate the vulnerability of the speaker verification, we em-
ploy the equal error rate (EER) andMinDCF (adopting the cost
parameters in the NIST SRE 2006 plan) measures.
We employ the JD-GMM and unit-selection methods to
generate spoofing data, as discussed in Section 2. We gen-
erate the same number of original impostor trials, JD-GMM
converted trials, and unit-selection converted trials. There are
290,622 and 258,180 trials for male and female speakers, re-
spectively. When calculating EER, the baseline test involves a
mix of genuine trials and original impostor trials, while the con-
verted voice test involves a mix of genuine trials and converted
trials. The actual numbers of trials are shown in Table 1. In this
way, we have the same number of trials for baseline test, JD-
GMM converted voice test, and unit-selection converted voice
test.
The EER and MinDCF results of the text-dependent and
text-independent speaker verification systems under spoofing
attack are presented in Table 3. For the text-independent
speaker verification system, the EER increases signicantly un-
der spoofing attacks from 17.17% to 30.20% and 27.53% for
female speakers by unit-selection and JD-GMM conversions,
respectively, and the MinDCF also increases. This confirms
our previous finding using several text-independent verifica-
tion systems including the classic GMM-UBM system and the
state-of-the-art JFA or PLDA system [10, 9]. However, for
the text-dependent speaker verification, the EER of female tri-
als drops from 4.79% to 2.39% and 1.84% for unit-selection
and JD-GMMbased conversions, respectively, and theMinDCF
also drops. We note that the target speaker model in the text-
dependent speaker verification system is estimated using the
matched pass-phrase utterances. Thus, the phonetic or linguis-
tic information is already taken into account. As the two voice
conversion conversion methods only focus on converting the
Table 3: Performance of text-dependent and text-independent speaker verification systems under spoofing.
Voice conversion
Equal error rates (EER %) 100 MinDCF
Text-Dependent Text-Independent Text-Dependent Text-Independent
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
None (Baseline) 6.62 4.79 15.32 17.17 3.25 2.81 6.85 7.71
Unit-selection 4.85 2.39 27.30 30.20 2.76 1.55 10.00 9.92
JD-GMM 4.51 1.84 25.87 27.53 2.55 1.19 9.99 9.88
spectral envelop, the duration and prosody information, which
are important factors in phonetic or linguistic information, are
kept the same as the impostor’s. Thus, the phonetic or linguistic
knowledge enables the text-dependent system to discriminate
converted speech from the original target speech.
We observe that the text independent speaker verification
system gives a higher EER under spoofing attacks, which sug-
gests that the spoofing attacks increase the log likelihood scores
of imposter trials. The increase of log-likelihood scores has
compromised the decision of the verification system. On the
other hand, text-dependent speaker verification system gives
lower EER under conversion spoofing attack. The phonetic or
linguistic discriminative information lowers the log-likelihood
scores of converted impostor trials, and strengthens the abil-
ity of making correct decision. To verify our assumption, we
present the log-likelihood scores distribution of impostor trials
before and after conversion in Fig. 1 and 2 from text-dependent
and text-independent system, respectively. From both score dis-
tributions, it shows that mean score under unit-selection con-
version spoofing attack is higher than that under JD-GMM con-
version attack, which is consistent with the EER and MinDCF
results.
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Figure 1: Impostor score distribution of text-dependent verifi-
cation system before and after conversion spoofing attacks
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Figure 2: Impostor score distribution of text-independent veri-
fication system before and after conversion spoofing attacks
Comparing with the two conversion methods, unit-selection
based conversion always gives higher EER and MinDCF than
JD-GMM based conversion. We note that unit selection based
conversion directly select target frames to compose the con-
verted speech. It is easy to understand that it generates speech
more similar to target speaker than JD-GMM based conversion
does, the latter employs a transformation function to map the
source speech to the target space.
From the view of voice conversion, unit-selection based
conversion directly selects target frames to make the converted
speech. Thus, it is able to generate speech more similar as tar-
get speaker than JD-GMM based conversion, which employs
transformation to shift the source speech to the target space.
In real application, the decision threshold of a speaker ver-
ification system is fixed and the threshold is based on the base-
line database without spoofing. The speaker verification sys-
tem is unaware of spoofing attacks. Thus, the spoofing attacks
may affect the false acceptance rate (FAR) considerably. To
assess the spoofing attack effect, we set the decision thresh-
old to the EER point on the baseline corpus without conver-
sion, and then examine the FAR under spoofing attacks. The
FARs under spoofing attacks simulated by unit-selection and
JD-GMM conversions are presented in Table 4. The FAR of
text-independent system for female speakers is increased from
17.17% to 44.40% and 39.28% by unit-selection and JD-GMM
conversions, respectively. However, for text-dependent system,
FAR is decreased from 4.79% to 1.19% and 0.73% of females
by unit-selection and JD-GMM conversions, respectively.
Table 4: Spoofing attack effect on false acceptance rates (FAR,
%). The verification decision threshold is set to the EER point
on the baseline corpus.
Text-Dependent Text-Independent
Voice conversion Male Female Male Female
No conversion 6.62 4.79 15.32 17.17
Unit-selection 3.44 1.19 42.56 44.40
JD-GMM 2.88 0.73 39.22 39.28
From the EER, MinDCF and FAR results, we observe that
text-dependent speaker verification system works much better
than text-independent speaker verification system under spoof-
ing attacks. We note that there are no original impostor trials in
the spoofing database. The FAR results show that the attacker
still has chances to break the text-independent system.
6. Conclusions
In this study, we examine the vulnerability of speaker verifi-
cation by comparing the performance of text-dependent and
text-independent speaker verification systems under spoofing
attacks, which are simulated by JD-GMM and unit-selection
based voice conversion methods. The experimental results show
that the phonetic or linguistic information is helpful in discrim-
inating converted speech from natural speech and makes the
text-dependent verification system more robust against spoof-
ing attack than text-independent system.
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